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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Having information that Larry Ashworth may have driven drunk to an Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting, police officers used the threat of arrest to force their way into that 
closed-door meeting and arrest Mr. Ashworth, even though they did not possess a 
warrant. Below, the district court suppressed all evidence obtained after the officers 
entered the closed meeting. 
The State has appealed. On appeal, the State argues that Mr. Ashworth failed to 
demonstrate that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting, and that society would not recognize any such expectation as 
reasonable anyway. Alternatively, the State argues that even if Mr. Ashworth did have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the meeting, the officers' entry into that meeting 
was proper based on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
Mr. Ashworth submits that the district court was correct to have suppressed all 
evidence discovered after the officers' entry into the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. 
He asserts first that he did, in fact, meet his burden of showing that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. Next, he argues that the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because: 
the State failed to meet its burden of showing a true "destruction of evidence" exigency 
because it failed to show that it was impracticable for the officers to obtain a warrant; 
and, even if the State did meet its burden in this regard, the fact is that DUI is such a 
minor offense that the "destruction of evidence" exigency cannot be used to justify a 
warrantless entry in this case. In making this last argument, Mr. Ashworth requests that 
State V. Robinson, 144 ldaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007), and portions of State 
V. Fees, 140 ldaho 81, 90 P.3d 306 (2004), be overruled. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On May 5, 2008, police received a phone tip from Jamie Allpress, a citizen- 
informant, reporting the sound of gunshots in Larry Ashworth's trailer. (R., p.55; Tr., 
p.1 I ,  Ls.6-17; see p.1 I ,  L.24 - p.12, L.3.) Ms. Allpress further reported that, a few 
minutes after the shots were fired, Mr. Ashworth walked out of his residence, got in his 
car, and left. (Tr., p.1 I ,  L.24 - p.12, L.3.) She indicated that, in her view, Mr. Ashworth 
was "extremely intoxicated." (Tr., p.12, Ls.4-22; see also Tr., p.1 I ,  Ls.18-20 
(presumably referring to Mr. Ashworth in describing the shooter as having been 
intoxicated).) 
Shortly after making her first phone call to the police, Ms. Allpress called back. 
(R., p.55; Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L. l l .)  This time, Ms. Allpress apparently provided the 
police with a description, including the license plate number of the vehicle Mr. Ashworth 
was driving, and she indicated that Mr. Ashworth was heading to an Alcoholics 
Anonymous (hereinafter, A.A.) meeting at the Weippe Senior Citizens Center. (R., p.55; 
Tr.,p.13, L.9-p.14, L.9.) 
Based on Ms. Allpress's reports, two police officers responded to the Senior 
Center. (R., p.55; Tr., p.14, L.10 - p.15, L.6.) After confirming that Mr. Ashworth's 
vehicle was present in the parking lot (R., p.55; Tr., p.15, Ls.8-lo), the officers knocked 
on the door of the Senior Center and the leader of the Alcoholics Anonymous group 
answered (R., p.56; Tr., p.16, Ls.20-24, p.26, Ls.11-23). In response to the officers' 
query, this gentleman confirmed that Mr. Ashworth was quite intoxicated (R., p.56; Tr., 
p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.3), but attempted to refuse the officers entrance to the Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting, telling them "that the matter was 'under control"' (R., p.56; see 
also Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.18). The officers, not to be deterred, demanded that the 
gentleman step aside and let them in lest they take "further action" action against him, 
i.e., arrest him for obstructing. (R., p.56; Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.18.) Not surprisingly, 
the gentleman yielded to the officers' threat. (See R., p.56; Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.21.) 
Once inside, the officers approached Mr. Ashworth, whereupon they observed 
that his eyes were red and glossy, that his speech was slurred, and that his head and 
shoulders were swaying in a circular motion. (R., p.56; Tr., p.20, Ls.16-21, p.20, L.25 - 
p.21, L.5.) At that time, they also elicited incriminating statements as to Mr. Ashworth's 
alleged drinking and driving. (R., p.56; Tr., p.17, L.10 - p.18, L.18.) Thereafter, the 
officers took Mr. Ashworth outside. (R., p.56; Tr., p.18, Ls.19-25.) While on the way 
outside, the officers observed that Mr. Ashworth's balance was very unsteady. (Tr., 
p.20, Ls.21-24.) Once outside, the officers administered a number of field sobriety tests 
(which they contend Mr. Ashworth failed), and arrested him for suspicion of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (hereinaffer, DUI). (R., p.56; Tr., p.19, L.1 - p.20, L.12.) 
Later, Mr. Ashworth underwent three breath tests, yielding blood alcohol concentrations 
of ,236, ,243, and ,274. (R., p.56; Tr., p.21, L.14-p.22, L.5.) 
Upon being arrested, Mr. Ashworth was issued a citation for misdemeanor 
excessive DUI under I.C. 5 18-8004~(1).' ( R  1 .  That citation appears to have been 
filed with the court the following day. (See R., p.1.) 
' Although the officer's citation does not identify the subsection of section 18-8004C that 
Mr. Ashworth was charged under, Mr. Ashworth must have been originally charged 
under subsection (I), the subsection defining the misdemeanor offense, because the 
On May 8, 2008, the State filed a Criminal Complaint charging Mr. Ashworth's I 
alleged offense as a felony excessive DUI under I.C. $j 18-8004C(2), based on the 1 
additional allegation that Mr. Ashworth had already been convicted of excessive DUI I 
once in the previous five years. (R., pp.15-16.) 
I 
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Ashworth was bound over into district court. I 
(R., pp.32-33.) Thus, on June 9, 2008, the State filed its Information. (R., p.34.) I 
On September 23, 2008, Mr. Ashworth filed a motion seeking suppression of all 
t 
evidence obtained following the officers' entry into the Senior Center. (R., pp.42, 44- 1 
49.) A week later, on September 30, 2008, the district court held a hearing on that I 
motion. (See generally R., pp.51-52; Tr.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the district 
I 
court took Mr. Ashworth's motion under advisement. (R., p.52.) I 
On October 10, 2008, the district court entered an order granting Mr. Ashworth's 
suppression motion. (R., pp.55-62.) In its order, the district court concluded that 
I 
Ms. Allpress's statements to the police were sufficient to provide the officers with a 1 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ashworth was guilty of DUI and, therefore, the officers 
had a Constitutional basis to engage in an investigatory detention of Mr. Ashworth (R., 
I 
pp.57-58, 61-62); however, it further concluded that Ms. Allpress's statements did not 1 
provide the officers with the probable cause necessary to effectuate an arrest of 
Mr. Ashworth. (R., pp.61-62.) 
I 
The district court also ruled that Mr. Ashworth had a reasonable expectation of I 
privacy in the A.A. meeting, finding as follows: 1 
citation indicates on its face that Mr. Ashworth was charged with a misdemeanor. (R., 
P.1.) I 
The test of whether Mr. Ashworth enjoyed an expectation of 
privacy, thus rests on both his and society's understanding of the privacy 
afford by attendance at an AA meeting. That the meeting occurred in a 
place open to the public does not detract from the fundamental purpose of 
the meeting-that the participants are free from prosecution and 
recrimination arising from their participation. While AA groups are open to 
all who wish to attend, they are not public affairs at which spectators are 
welcome. The meetings are purpose-driven; those wishing to attend are 
welcome insofar as they seek to aid in the recovery of other members of 
the group. Certainly, if a group member admitted during a meeting that he 
had driven to the meeting while drunk, neither society nor other members 
would consider that information public currency. The nature of Alcoholics 
Anonymous conveys an objective understanding of a group that protects 
the anonymity of its members. Information imparted to the group in a 
meeting where the privacy of those attending is expected is intended to be 
held in confidence by other members. [The group leader's] effort to 
exclude [the officers] from the meeting is a testament to that expectation. 
When Mr. Ashworth arrived at the meeting, he did not knowingly 
expose himself to the public. He relied on the privacy implicit in the 
function of the group. . . . 
(R., pp.59-60.) Based on its conclusion that Mr. Ashworth had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting, the district court noted that the officers would 
have been justified in making their warrantless, unconsented entry to the Senior Center 
only if they had had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, and 
there was some exigency that excused their failure to obtain a warrant. (R., pp.60-62.) 
Because, as noted, the district court found that no probable cause existed, it determined 
that the officers had no right to forcibly enter the Senior Center without a warrant and 
their entry, therefore, violated Mr. Ashworth's Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.60-62.) 
On October 15, 2008, the State timely appealed the district court's suppression 
order. (R., pp.64-66.) On appeal, the State offers two arguments: first, the State 
argues that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Ashworth had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8); second, assuming 
for the sake of argument that Mr. Ashworth did have an expectation of privacy in the 
A.A. meeting, the State argues in the alternative that the district court erred in finding 1 
that the officers' forced entry into the A.A. meeting was not justified by exigent I 
circumstances (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11). I 
ISSUES 
The State has framed the issue on appeal as follows: "Did the district court err in 
concluding that Ashworth had a privacy interest that prevented the officers from 
contacting him during an Alcoholics ~ n o n ~ m o b s  meeting at the Weippe Senior Center?" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) However, Mr. Ashworth asserts that this broad recitation of the 
State's claim on appeal is more easily understood as raising two discrete issues: 
1. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Ashworth had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a closed Alcoholics Anonymous meeting? 
2. Assuming Mr. Ashworth did, in fact, have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a closed Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, did police officers 
violate his Fourth Amendment rights by making a warrantless, 
unconsented entry into that meeting in furtherance of a DUI investigation? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Correctlv Found That Mr. Ashworth Had A Reasonable Expectation 
Of Privacv In A Closed Alcoholics Anonvmous Meeting 
As noted, the State's first argument on appeal is that Mr. Ashworth lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting and that, as a 
result, he cannot be heard to complain about the officers' warrantless, unconsented 
entry into that meeting. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.) This is an important question since 
the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a 
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (emphasis added). Moreover, as the 
State correctly notes (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6), it is the defendant's burden to 
demonstrate that he has such a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
place or thing at issue. Id. at 130 n.1. 
Within its broader argument that Mr. Ashworth lacked a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, the State claims that the district court 
erred in three respects: first, the State claims that the district court erred as a matter of 
law by failing to recognize that the "expectation of privacy" inquiry was a threshold 
determination, the burden of proof of which rested with Mr. Ashworth (Appellant's Brief, 
p.6); second, that State argues that, as a factual matter, the district court clearly erred in 
concluding that Mr. Ashworth had a subjective expectation of privacy in the A.A. 
meeting because Mr. Ashworth never explicitly testified that he had such an expectation 
of privacy (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7); and third, the State asserts that the district court 
erred, as a matter of law, in finding that an expectation of privacy in an Alcoholics 
Anonymous meeting is one that society would recognize as reasonable (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-8). For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of these arguments have 
merit. 
A. The District Court Correctlv Treated The "Expectation Of Privacy" Inquiry As A 
Threshold Question Upon Which Mr. Ashworth Bore The Burden Of Proof 
As noted above, Mr. Ashworth recognizes that it was his obligation to show that 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting before he could claim 
any infringement of his Fourth Amendment rights through the officers' warrantless and 
unconsented entry into that meeting. Nevertheless, the State contends that the districf 
court failed to recognize Mr. Ashworth's threshold obligation and, instead, "treated the 
lack of privacy interest as a warrant exception and placed the burden of proof on the 
state." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) There is a fatal flaw, however, with the State's 
argument-it is premised upon a gross mischaracterization of the district court's order. 
While the page of the district court's order that is cited by the State certainly 
discusses the fact that a warrantless search cannot be justified unless the government 
can prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, as well as the fact that, 
in order to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant must have an 
expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched (and it even does so in the same 
paragraph, the first paragraph on the page), nowhere does that page state that a lack of 
an expectation of privacy is an exception to the warrant requirement, or that the 
government bears the burden of proving a lack of an expectation of privacy. (See R., 
p.59.) Indeed, while a portion of the page in question could certainly have been more 
carefully crafted (perhaps with a paragraph break immediately following the citation to 
States V. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)), even a tortured reading of the district court's 
order does not bear out the State's present mischaracterization of that order. Moreover, 
when one reads beyond the page relied upon by the State, it becomes that much more 
clear that the district court's "expectation of privacy" inquiry was preliminary to any 
attempt to hold the State to its burden of proving the existence of an exception to the 
warrant requirement. (See, e.g., R., p.60 ("When Mr. Ashworth arrived at the meeting, 
he did not knowingly expose himself to the public. He relied on the privacy implicit in 
the function of the group. The State must, therefore, demonstrate that it satisfies an 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.").) 
B. The District Court Correctly Found That Mr. Ashworth Had A Subiective 
Expectation Of Privacy In The A.A. Meeting 
Again, the State is correct in its recitation of the applicable legal standard when it 
asserts that, in order to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the officers' actions in 
this case, it was incumbent upon Mr. Ashworth to demonstrate his actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting, and to show that that expectation of privacy 
was objectively reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); State v. 
Delacerda, 135 Idaho 903, 904, 26 P.3d 1240, 1241 (Ct. App. 2001). However, the 
State is flatly incorrect insofar as it argues that the district court's factual finding that 
Mr. Ashworth had a subjective expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting is in error. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
To the extent that the State complains that Mr. Ashworth failed to prove his 
subjective expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting because, "[allthough Ashworth 
took the stand, he never testified that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
town's senior center" (Appellant's Brief, p.6), the State clearly misunderstands the case 
law cited in its own brief. In Smifh v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court made 
it clear that the defendant need not take the witness stand and boldly declare: "I had an 
expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized!" In fact, the Smifh Court 
suggested that such a posf hoc declaration, standing alone, would be rather unhelpful, 
as the relevant inquiry is "whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,'-whether, in the words of the Kafz majority, 
the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as private."' Smith, 442 
U.S. at 740 (quoting Kafz v. United Sfafes, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)) (emphasis added). 
Applying the correct standard, as articulated in Smifh, it is obvious that the district 
court did not clearly err by finding that Mr. Ashworth had a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the A.A. meeting because that finding is supported by "substantial evidence in 
the record." Sfafe v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 155, 983 P.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 1999). 
First, as the district court seems to have noted, Alcoholics Anonymous, by definition, is 
clearly an organization that is concerned with the anonymity, i.e., the privacy, of its 
members. (See R., p.60 ("The nature of Alcoholics Anonymous conveys an objective 
understanding of a group that protects the anonymity of its members.").) Second, the 
Record on Appeal demonstrates that the A.A. meeting at issue in this case was 
intended to be a private gathering, in that it was held behind closed doors.2 (Tr., p.26, 
Ls.41-23) Third, the notion that the A.A. meeting at issue in this case was intended to 
be private or, in the words of the district court, was not a "public affair[ ] at which 
spectators [wejre welcome" (R., p.59), is supported by the fact that, after the officers 
Even the officers apparently recognized that a closed door is an important indicator of 
a desire for privacy in our society, as they chose to knock on that closed door instead of 
walking right in. (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-23) 
knocked on the closed door of the Senior Center, the facilitator of the A.A. meeting 
blocked their entry and indicated that they were not welcome to enter.3 (R., p.56; see 
Tr., p.26, L.24-p.27, L.18.) 
Finally, to the extent that the State complains that the district court's fairly lengthy 
discussion of the nature of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings was not supported by any 
evidence in the record, Mr. Ashworth submits that the State's argument is misplaced, as 
it assumes that the district court has no ability to draw upon common sense or 
commonly-accepted facts. The fact is that A.A. is a renowned organization, and its 12- 
step program is widely recognized-not just within the court system but within society 
as a whole-as the most likely chance for recovery for alcoholics. Indeed, this is not the 
first case where a learned court has looked beyond the testimony at hand to highlight 
some widely-accepted facts regarding Alcoholics Anonymous. See, e.g., Cox v. Miller, 
296 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing to "A.A. informational literature," and other 
Below, the State attempted to make much of the fact that the A.A. meeting at issue 
was held at the Weippe Senior Center, which it sought to characterize as a public 
building. (See, e.g., Tr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.l, p.49, Ls.4-5, p.52, Ls.15-20.) However, 
this claim of "public" access is not borne out by the record, as the only evidence tending 
to show that the Weippe Senior Center is open to the public was the testimony of one of 
the officers, who stated that he "consider[s]" it a "public building," apparently because 
"public events" are held there. (Tr., p.16, Ls.4-10.) However, the supposedly "public 
events" that the officer was referring to-Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, Narcotics 
Anonymous meetings, weddings, parties, and other "events that individuals put on 
there" (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-I9 (emphasis added)) are not the types of events that a 
reasonable person would think of as being "public" at all. Rather, the evidence in the 
record makes it clear that the Senior Center, whether it is owned and operated by the 
local government and, therefore, technically a "public" building, or, instead, a private 
non-profit organization, a tribe, or some other entity, is one that is available for distinctly 
private functions. And, of course, as the district court noted, "[tlhe point is not that [a 
place] is 'accessible to the public' at other times, but that it is a temporarily private place 
whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable." (R., p.59 n.1 (quoting Kafz v. United Sfafes, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)) (alterations by district court).) 
sources apparently outside the appellate record, to support its discussion of the history, 
mission, and methodology of A.A.). Accordingly, it was neither improper, nor 
unreasonable, for the district court to have drawn upon the commonly-held 
understanding that, while all alcoholics are welcome to attend, and to seek help at A.A. 
meetings, "[alnyone who turns to A.A. can be assured that his or her anonymity will be 
protected." ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THIS IS A.A. AN ~NTRODUCTION TO THE A.A. 
RECOVERY PROGWM 19 (available at <www.aa.org>); cf. Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d at 112 
(declining to require adoption of an "A.A. privilege" limiting the admission of certain 
evidence at trial, but nonetheless observing that there is "no reason to doubt the 
importance of confidentiality of communication to the success of the A.A. program"). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Found That Mr. Ashworth's Expectation Of Privacv In 
The A.A. Meetinq Was One That Society Recoanizes As Reasonable 
The State complains that the district court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that 
Mr. Ashworth's expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting at issue in this case was 
objectively reasonable. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) In particular, the State takes issue 
with the district court's conclusion that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable 
based on "society's understanding of the privacy afforded by attendance at an AA 
meeting," and because "[tlhe nature of Alcoholics Anonymous conveys an objective 
understanding of a group that protects the anonymity of its members." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.7 (quoting R., pp.59-60).) The State complains that the mere desire for 
anonymity is not sufficient for society to recognize the value of such anonymity, and it 
seeks to draw an analogy to "any criminal syndicate" seeking to have its "meetings of 
conspiracies . . . blanketed with Fourth Amendment protection." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
While the State's very alarmist analogy is certainly vivid, it is not apt. As noted, 
the standard is simply whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable. Thus, the relevant question in this case is very straightforward: Was 
Mr. Ashworth reasonable to expect privacy in a closed-door meeting (essentially a 
group treatment session) for alcohol-addicted individuals in a treatment program where 
one of the fundamental tenets of the program is respect for the anonymity, i.e., privacy, 
of the other participants. Undoubtedly, the answer to that question is "yes." Therefore, 
the district court committed no error. 
The District Court Correctly Ruled That Police Officers' Warrantless Entw Into The 
Private Sphere Of An Alcoholics Anonymous Meetinn, Based Soleiv Upon The Officers' 
Desire To Obtain Evidence Of A Simple DUI, Is Unreasonable And. Therefore, 
Unconstitutional 
A. Introduction 
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court held "that the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry 
into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrestM4 Payfon v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). A few years later, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 
(1984), the Supreme Court: (a) re-affirmed Payfon's general prohibition against in-home 
warrantless arrests, Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748-49; (b) explicitly recognized that an 
Although this case involves a police entry into an A.A. meeting, not a home, 
Mr. Ashworth nevertheless contends that Payton and its progeny control. As was stated 
in Kafz v. Unifed Sfates, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not just specific places. Therefore, there is no principled reason to distinguish 
between the home entries disapproved in Payfon and subsequent cases, and the entry 
into the private, i.e., constitutionally-protected, A.A. meeting that is at-issue in this case. 
exception to the general rule exists where the police have probable cause to arrest and 
exigent circumstances make waiting for a warrant impractical,5 id. at 749-50; and 
(c) held that, even assuming that the body's metabolism of alcohol constitutes a 
"destruction of evidence" exigency, probable cause to believe that a suspect has driven 
while under the influence of alcohol does not allow the police to dispense with the 
warrant requirement since drunk driving is a relatively minor offense, the successful 
prosecution of which does not justify a warrantless entry into the sanctity of the home, 
id. at 750-55. 
In recent years, for reasons that are discussed in detail below, the ldaho Court of 
Appeals has limited Welsh to its unique facts and has held that, in ldaho, if the police 
have probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a DUI offense, based 
on the evanescent nature of blood alcohol evidence, they may enter the suspect's home 
in order to effectuate an arrest, even if they do not have a warrant. State v. Robinson, 
144 ldaho 496,501-02,163 P.3d 1208,1213-14 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Based on Robinson, the State argues that, even if Mr.Ashworth had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the A.A. meeting in question, the officers' entry into 
that meeting did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) 
The State reasons that this case is just like Robinson, and it asserts that, because the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Ashworth for DUI, and because 
Mr. Ashworth's body was breaking down the alcohol in his bloodstream, the exigent 
In Payton, the Supreme Court had specifically declined to address the question of 
whether exigent circumstances might allow for a warrantless in-home arrest, Payton, 
445 U.S. at 582-83; however, it strongly hinted that it would, see id. at 590. 
circumstances exception applies and the officers could enter the private A.A. meeting 
without a warrant in order to arrest Mr. Ashworth. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) 
The State's arguments are without merit. Even assuming that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Ashworth on suspicion of DUI, the State's reliance on the 
exigent circumstances exception is misplaced. First, the State failed to meet its burden 
of proof as to the existence of a true exigency. Second, even if the State proved the 
existence of a true exigency, because Robinson was incorrectly decided insofar as it 
held that the exigent circumstances exception applies even to minor offenses such as 
simple DUI, there can be no finding that exigent circumstances excused the officers' 
failure to obtain a warrant in this case. 
B. Even Assuminq The Officers Had Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. Ashworth On 
Suspicion Of DUI, The State Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Provinq The Existence 
Of A True Exiqencv Justifvina A Warrantless Entrv Into The A.A. Meeting 
In Welsh, supra, the Supreme Court made it clear "that exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are few in number and carefully delineated, and that the police bear a 
heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify 
warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Indeed, the ldaho Supreme Court 
recognized that a mere claim of exigency does not provide a free pass to ignore the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant preference when it observed that "[tlhere can be no 
question that the exception [for exigent circumstances] does not swallow the rule . . . ." 
State v. Curl, 125 ldaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993). 
Since we know that "[tlhe exigent circumstances exception does not apply where 
there is time to secure a warrant," Sfate v. Robinson, 144 ldaho 496, 501, 163 P.3d 
1208, 121 1 (Ct. App. 2007),~ it ought not to be surprising that, in Robinson, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held the State to its burden of demonstrating the impracticability of 
obtaining a warrant before finding an exigency that excused the warrantless entry in a 
given case. In that case, the Court of Appeals approved of the warrantless entry not 
just because the State demonstrated probable cause to arrest and a legitimate concern 
about the destruction of evidence, but also because there was testimony "regarding the 
impracticability of obtaining a warrant at such a late night hour, saying it ordinarily took 
several hours." Robinson, 144 Idaho at 501, 163 P.2d at 121 1. See also Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (discussing the exigency attendant to the 
body's metabolism of blood alcohol in a slightly different context, but focusing 
nonetheless on the facts relating to the impracticability of securing a warrant). 
In this case, although the State clearly presented evidence tending to show a 
legitimate concern about Mr. Ashworth's body's gradual destruction of the evidence 
against him, i.e., his blood alcohol, it never even attempted to present evidence tending 
to show that it would have been impracticable for the officers to have secured a warrant 
prior to entering the A.A. meeting. (See generally Tr.) Thus, it may very well be that the 
officers in this case could have secured a warrant within a matter of just a few  minute^.^ 
In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the United States Supreme Court noted that 
"a warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is 
compelling need for official action and no time fo secure a warrant." Id. at 509 
$emphasis added). 
Obviously, a delay of just a few minutes might be critical if there is a legitimate concern 
that all of the evidence in question could be destroyed in a single, brief conflagration or 
the flush of a toilet; however, by its very nature the evidence in question in this case, 
blood alcohol, diminishes slowly and steadily over the course of hours. Accordingly, 
when it is blood alcohol that is at stake, a delay of just a few minutes is negligible and 
cannot justify with dispensing of the warrant requirement. To say that it does justify 
dispensing with the warrant requirement would be to create a broad new "alcohol" 
After all, we live in an era when mobile phones, patrol car-mounted computers, and on- 
call magistrates are ubiquitous, and we are talking about entry that took place at 
approximately 8:00 p.m. (see Tr., p.15, Ls.14-19)-hardly a time when one would have 
concerns about people having to be roused from bed to get anything done. However, 
such speculation is unnecessary since it was the State's burden to prove the existence 
of an exigency justifying the warrantless entry, and it failed to do so. 
C. Even Assuminq The Officers Had Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. Ashworth On 
Suspicion Of DUI. And Even Assuminq The State Met Its Burden Of Provinq The 
Existence Of A True Exi~ency, The Officers Were Not Free To Enter The A.A. 
Meetinq Without A Warrant Because The Offense In Question-Simple DUI-Is 
Not Severe Enouah To Warrant Such An Intrusion 
As discussed above, in Welsh, the United States Supreme Court: (a) re-affirmed 
Payton's general prohibition against in-home warrantless arrests, Welsh, 466 U.S. at 
748-49; (b) explicitly recognized that an exception to the general rule exists where the 
police have probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances make waiting for a 
warrant impractical, id. at 749-50; and (c) held that, even assuming that the body's 
metabolism of alcohol constitutes a "destruction of evidence" exigency, probable cause 
to believe that a suspect has driven while under the influence of alcohol does not allow 
the police to dispense with the warrant requirement since drunk driving is a relatively 
minor offense, the successful prosecution of which does not justify a warrantless entry 
into the sanctity of the home, id. at 750-55. This last point concerning the relatively 
minor nature of a drunk driving offense has led to a fair degree of confusion in the law. 
exception to the warrant requirement that would contravene Welsh's admonition that 
"exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated, and 
. . . the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 
might justify warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Welsh, the Court made it clear that, in evaluating the reasonableness of a 
warrantless entry in to a private space, one factor to consider in determining whether 
there was a true exigency excusing that warrantless entry, is the gravity of the offense 
that is at issue: 
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when 
warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate 
when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is 
relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity 
of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent 
circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that 
attaches to all warrantless home entries. When the government's interest 
is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness 
is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make 
such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. 
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Welsh 
Court then went on to discuss, with approval, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in 
McDonald v. Unifed Sfafes, 335 U.S. 451 (1948): "Justice Jackson explained why a 
finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely 
restricted when only a minor offense has been committed . . . ." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 
750. The Welsh Court then went on to quote heavily from Justice Jackson's opinion in 
McDonald, wherein Justice Jackson had argued that, in assessing the reasonableness 
of a warrantless search undertaken based on a claimed exigency, the reviewing court 
ought to consider the "gravity of the offense thought to be in progress," and wherein 
Justice Jackson seemed to endorse a "gravity" analysis that turns on whether the 
suspected offense is violent or non-violent in nature. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751. 
Ultimately, the Welsh Court stated the rules as follows: "[Aln important factor to be 
considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the 
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made." Id. at 753. 
In Welsh, the Court was faced with a situation where officers had entered a 
house, without a warrant, in order to effectuate an arrest of someone for whom the 
officers had probable cause to believe had violated Wisconsin's drunk driving law. See 
id. at 742-43. In applying the rule articulated above, the Court held that the officers' 
entry was unreasonable because the offense for which they sought to arrest the suspect 
for-drunk driving-was a relatively minor one. Id. at 753-54. In classifying the drunk 
driving offense as a minor one, the Court stated as follows: 
The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving 
while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no 
imprisonment is possible. This is the best indication of the State's interest 
in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by 
the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest. Given this 
expression of the State's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be 
upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alcohol level 
might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. 
Id. at 754. Elsewhere, the Court explained further that, "[gjiven that the classification of 
state crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any 
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the 
State's interest n arresting individuals suspected of committing that offense." Id. a 754 
n.14. 
Clearly, the Welsh Court did not give the clear and consistent guidance that it 
intended to give, as that opinion has generated a great deal of confusion as to how the 
"gravity of the offense" should be evaluated in determining whether exigent 
circumstances justify a warrantless entry. Does the gravity of the offense turn on 
whether it was a violent crime? Does it turn on some sort of distinction between 
felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions? Or does it depend on the totality of the 
circumstances? 
The ldaho Supreme Court attempted to interpret Welsh in State v. Curl, 125 
ldaho 224, 869 P.2d 224 (1993), a case involving an officer's warrantless entry into an 
apartment based on the fact that he had probable cause to believe that marijuana was 
being smoked therein. In that case, the Court held that the gravity of the offense was 
measured by determining whether it was a violent or non-violent offense and, finding 
that possession of marijuana is, of course, a non-violent offense, it went on to hold that 
the officer's entry into the apartment was unreasonable. Id. at 225-27, 869 P.2d at 225- 
27. 
Since Curl was decided, the United States Supreme Court has either clarified the 
holding of Welsh, or further confused it, depending on who you talk to. 
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (ZOO?), did not involve a warrantless entry in 
order to effectuate an arrest; instead, it involved a situation where an officer detained a 
suspect outside his home while another officer went to get a search warrant for the 
home. Ultimately, the Court held that this temporary detention was reasonable and, 
therefore, permissible under the Fourth Amendment, because: (1) the officers had 
probable cause to believe that unlawful drugs were present in the home; (2) the officers 
had good reason to believe that if the suspect was not detained outside his home, he 
would destroy the drugs before the warrant could arrive; (3) the officers' actions were 
limited in scope in that there was virtually no intrusion into the privacy of the residence 
because the suspect was already outside when he was restrained, and because 
restraint was minimal, extending only to the suspect's ability to re-enter his home 
unaccompanied; and (4) the duration of the restraint was limited. Id. at 331-33. The 
Welsh opinion did not factor into this holding at all, see id. at 330-33; however, because 
the defendant had argued that Welsh should apply by analogy, the Court addressed his 
argument in dicta. In doing so, the Court explained that Welsh was wholly 
distinguishable and, therefore, simply did not apply, for two reasons: (a) the restriction 
at issue, ie., preventing someone who is already in the public view from re-entering his 
home, is far less serious than the conduct that was at issue in Welsh, i.e., a warrantless 
entry into a home; and (b) the misdemeanor offense at issue is a jailable offense, 
whereas the offense that was at issue in Welsh was non-jailable under Wisconsin law. 
Id. at 952-53. 
Based on the dicta in McArthur, the ldaho Supreme Court has effectively 
overruled a portion of its Curl decision. In State v. Fees, 140 ldaho 81, 90 P.3d 306 
(2004), the Supreme Court interpreted MeArthur as making it clear that the gravity of an 
offense is measured based solely on "the nature of the penalty for that criminal 
conduct." Id. at 313. In that case, the Court went on to hold that it was reasonable for 
police to enter a home and seize its occupants where they had probable cause to 
believe that evidence of drug trafficking, a crime that carries a substantial prison 
sentence, would be found therein, and where the officers feared that that evidence 
would be destroyed if they waited for a warrant. Id. at 313-14. 
More recently, the ldaho Court of Appeals has decided Robinson, supra. In 
Robinson, the Court of Appeals, relying on the ldaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the interplay between Welsh and MeArthur in Fees, held that because every DUI in 
ldaho is a jailable offense, it is never a "relatively minor offense" within the meaning of 
Welsh, and the police were reasonable in making a warrantless entry into the 
defendant's home where they had probable cause to believe that she had committed a 
DUI offense, and they demonstrated that it was impracticable to obtain a warrant before 
I the defendant's body metabolized much of the alcohol in her blood. Robinson, 144 
I 
ldaho at 500-01, 163 P.3d at 1212-1 3. 
I 
In light of Robinson, if this Court were to determine that the officers in this case 
I had probable cause to arrest Mr. Ashworth on suspicion of DUI, and the State met its 
burden of showing the existence of a true exigency, i.e., that it was impracticable for 
I 
them to get a warrant before a significant amount of the alcohol in Mr. Ashworth's blood 
was metabolized, it would undoubtedly be very tempting for this Court to reverse the 
district court's suppression order; however, because Robinson and, to a certain extent, 
Fees, were incorrectly decided, that would be the wrong thing to do. 
Mr. Ashworth respectfully submits that the ldaho courts' bright-line distinction 
between jailable and non-jailable offenses for weighing "the gravity of the underlying 
offense" for purposes of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement, while certainly easy to understand and apply, represents a 
misunderstanding of Welsh, and a misapplication of Fourth Amendment principles. The 
reality is that if the determination of whether there exists an exigency that would excuse 
a warrantless entry turns on how a given jurisdiction punishes a particular offense, the 
scope of our rights under the United States Constitution would, in many instances, 
depend solely on what state we happen to be in at a given time. In other words, the 
Fourth Amendment might mean one thing in Moscow, Idaho, and something else 
entirely down the road in Pullman, Washington; it might provide greater protection in 
i 
Jackson, Wyoming than in Victor, Idaho. Surely, this cannot be the case. See Virginia 
I 
v. Moore, - U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008) (holding that neither an arrest, nor a 
subsequent search incident to that arrest, were violative of the Fourth Amendment 
simply because they were in contravention of a state law forbidding an arrest for the 
type of offense at issue, and reaching this holding, in part, because "linking Fourth 
Amendment protections to state law would cause them to 'vary from place to place and 
from time to time"'); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (declining to 
address the subjective intent of an officer making a pretextual traffic stop, in part, 
because "police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a 
judge, vary from place to place and from time to time," and because the Supreme Court 
could not "accept that the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are 
so variable"). 
In a very recent case, Hopkins v. Bonvicino, - F. 3d -, 2009 WL 2052987 (9th 
Cir. Jul. 16, 2009), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected outright the 
jailable/nonjailable distinction that has been adopted in Idaho. Hopkins involved a civil 
rights claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it squarely addressed the precise 
issue discussed in Robinson and potentially at-issue in this case. In Hopkins, police 
made a warrantless entry into the plaintiff, Mr. Hokins', house and arrested him on 
suspicion of DUI. Id. at *I. In Mr. Hopkins' criminal case, the state trial court judge 
granted his suppression motion and the criminal charges against him were quickly 
dropped. Id. at *3. Thereafter, he sued the officers who broke into his home. Id. The 
officers sought to defend themselves by arguing, inter alia, that their entry into 
Mr. Hopkins' home was consistent with the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement. In doing so, they highlighted a recent California Supreme Court case 
(People v. Thompson, 135 P.3d 3 (2006)) which, like the ldaho courts, had relied on the 
dicta in ~WcArthur, supra, in holding that the "relatively minor" offense standard 
discussed in Welsh applied only to non-jailable  offense^.^ See Hopkins at *9. 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected the California Supreme 
Court's approach to this issue (and, by extension, the ldaho approach), holding as 
follows: 
[Tlhis [jailablelnonjailable distinction] is not the distinction that the United 
States Supreme Court drew in Welsh, nor is it the distinction that this 
circuit has repeatedly emphasized in its own exigency-exception 
decisions. To the contrary, in Welsh the Supreme Court held that the 
exigency analysis must turn on "the gravity of the underlying offense," not 
its status as "jailable" or "nonjailable." The Court specifically said that a 
finding of exigent circumstances is particularly inappropriate "when the 
underlying offense . . . is particularly minor," and cited favorably "those 
courts addressing the issue [that] have refused to permit warrantless 
home arrests for nonfelonious crimes." The Supreme Court expressly did 
not limit its holding in Welsh to nonjailable offenses; to the contrary, it 
suggested that exigent circumstances can rarely, if ever, support entry into 
a home to investigate or arrest someone for a misdemeanor offense 
Hopkins at *9 (first alteration added) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The 
Hopkins Court then discussed the fact that the Ninth Circuit had always favored a 
felonylmisdemeanor distinction (as opposed to a jailable/nonjailable distinction) and it 
noted that Mr. Hopkins was indisputably arrested for a misdemeanor DUI. Id. at * l o .  
But the Court of Appeals also noted that, "[mjore important, [DUI] is the precise offense 
that the Supreme Court held insufficient to justify a warrantless entry in Welsh. 
Accordingly, even were there probable cause that Hopkins had in fact been driving 
under the influence, a warrantless entry into his home was unjustified." Id. Thus, 
Hopkins makes it clear that the jailablelnonjailable distinction now favored in ldaho is 
not faithful to Welsh, or the Fourth Amendment. 
See Thompson, 135 P.3d at 8-1 1 
A much better reading of Welsh is that it outlined a totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, whereby the manner in which an offense is generally punished is the best indicator 
of the gravity of the offense. In other words, with regard to the facts of this case, the 
question should be whether driving under the influence of alcohol, with no known 
aggravating factors,' is, generally speaking, a relatively minor offense. Of course, the 
Welsh Court already answered this question, holding that driving while under the 
influence of alcohol is, in fact, a relatively minor offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754. Thus, 
in this case, there was no exigency allowing for the officers to enter the A.A. meeting to 
arrest Mr. Ashworth without a warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ashworth respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's October 10, 2008 suppression order. 
DATED this 24" day of August, 2009. 
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ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
While Mr. Ashworth was ultimately charged with a felony DUI under I.C. 3 18-8004C(2) 
for having a blood alcohol concentration that was above 0.20, and for having had 
another "excessive alcohol concentration" DUI conviction in the previous five years (R., 
pp.15-16), the State has failed to demonstrate that the officers had reason to believe 
that Mr. Ashworth had an excessive blood alcohol concentration, much less that he had 
an excessive blood alcohol concentration and that he had a previous conviction for DUI 
involving an excessive blood alcohol concentration. (See generally Tr.) Indeed, the 
record seems to indicate othetwise insofar as it indicates that Mr. Ashworth was 
originally given a misdemeanor citation. (R., p.1.) Accordingly, as far as the officers 
were concerned, they were investigating a simple DUI. 
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